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THE EFFECT OF INITIAL ENDOWMENTS
IN EXPERIMENTAL AUCTIONS
JAY R. CORRIGAN AND MATTHEW C. ROUSU
We report the results of an experiment designed to test whether initial endowments affect value
estimates elicited from experimental auctions. Comparing bids for one unit of a good, two units of a
good, and a second unit of a good when endowed with the ﬁrst unit, we ﬁnd that willingness to pay for
the second unit of a good is, on average, as much as 75% higher when endowed with the ﬁrst unit. We
go on to advance two theories that could potentially reconcile our results with neoclassical consumer
theory.
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When consumers purchase products at a store
or in a conventional auction outside of an ex-
perimental setting, the market usually consists
ofanonbarterexchange,whereconsumerspay
money for a good. However, researchers using
experimental auctions to estimate the value of
newproductsorproducttraitsroutinelyendow
participantswithonegoodandthenofferthem
the chance to bid to upgrade to a (presumably
superior) good possessing the trait of inter-
est.1 Participants’ bids are interpreted as the
value they place on this trait. Yet this simple
analysis is not consistent with the large body
of behavioral literature suggesting that prefer-
ences are reference dependent.2 This endow-
and-upgrade approach may also yield value
estimates confounded by a “top-dog effect”
(i.e., participants derive additional utility from
being declared the winner of an auction) or
by a sense of “reciprocal obligation” (i.e., par-
ticipants wish to repay the experimenter for
endowing them with a good).
In this article, we present the design and re-
sults of an economic experiment intended to
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1 Examples include Alfnes and Rickertsen (2003), Buhr et al.
(1993), Dickinson and Bailey (2002), Fox (1995), Fox, Hayes, and
Shogren (2002), Fox et al. (1994, 1995), Hayes et al. (1995), Lusk
et al. (2001a,b), Shogren, List, and Hayes (2000), and Shogren
et al. (1994).
2 See Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1991) for a nice review.
test whether endowing agents with a good af-
fectstheirvaluationofthatgoodinthecontext
ofanexperimentalauction.Byelicitingpartic-
ipants’ willingness to pay (WTP) for one unit
of a good, two units of a good, and a second
unitofagoodwhentheyareendowedwiththe
ﬁrst unit, we show that endowing participants
with the ﬁrst unit has a large and statistically
signiﬁcant effect on WTP for the second unit.
The Endowment Effect and Experimental
Auction Valuation
Although authors give various justiﬁcations
for endowing participants with a good, it
seems likely that Shogren et al. (1994) set the
precedent by using the endow-and-upgrade
approach in their seminal study testing, com-
peting explanations for the disparity between
consumers’ WTP and willingness to accept
(WTA) payment. In WTP treatments the au-
thorsendowedparticipantswithvariousgoods
before asking them to bid to upgrade to supe-
rior goods in two sets of auction rounds. WTA
treatments were similar, except that partici-




While the authors may or may not have
viewed the endowment approach as superior
for estimating the value of the goods up for
auction, the primary goal of their study was
to test how the endowment effect inﬂuenced
the disparity between WTP and WTA. There-
fore, it was necessary that their participants
be given an initial endowment. Other authors
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interestedinestimatingthevalueofnewprod-
ucts or product traits have since used the
endow-and-upgradetechnique,citingShogren
et al. (1994) for support.
For thirty years, economists have been
aware that agents typically value a good more
highly if it is already in their possession.3
Thaler (1980) was the ﬁrst to formalize this
concept, using prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979) to explain a number of
“economic mental illusions,” including the
endowment effect. Tversky and Kahneman
(1991) go on to use prospect theory to ex-
plain loss aversion, a situation where potential
losses ﬁgure more prominently in the agent’s
mindthandopotentialgains.Theauthorsthen
demonstrate how loss aversion can lead to
the endowment effect. Today, loss aversion is
widely held to be the root cause of the endow-
ment effect.4
Munro and Sugden (2003) offer the most
current theoretical treatment of reference-
dependent preferences, presenting a frame-
work which they argue performs as well as
Tversky and Kahneman’s (1991) in terms
of explaining the anomalies described by
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1991), but
that is also more consistent with neoclassical
consumer theory. The authors ﬁnd what they
call a “reﬂexive optimum,” a bundle of goods
that is optimal to consume when the consumer
is endowed with that bundle. An economy has
allocated resources efﬁciently when each in-
dividual is consuming at his or her reﬂexive
optimum.
Given the attention that the endowment ef-
fect has received in the behavioral literature,
therehasbeensurprisinglylittleattentionpaid




with a generic steak and then asking them to
bid to upgrade to a premium steak yields dif-
ferent results than asking participants bid on
thetwosteaksseparately.Theirresultsaream-
biguous in that the sign and the magnitude of
the endowment effect depend on the auction
mechanism used. As we will argue later in this
article,thisambiguitymightbeexpectedgiven
3 SeeBecker,Ronen,andSorter(1974)andNeumannandFried-
man (1978) for early empirical evidence of this phenomenon.
4 Referring to the endowment effect, Kahneman, Knetsch, and
Thaler(1990,p.1326)statethat“thiseffectisamanifestationofloss
aversion.” According to Morrison (1998, p. 189), “the endowment
effectproposesthatpeoplevaluegoodsmorehighlyoncetheyown
them—perhaps the result of a sort of loss aversion.”
thattheeffectsoflossaversionareconfounded
by other effects arising from the initial endow-
ment. This is why we have carefully designed
our experiment to eliminate the possibility of
loss aversion.
Experimental Design
Ninety-four undergraduate students at Iowa
State University participated in this experi-
ment in June 2002. The participants bid on
combinationsofthefollowingthreefoodprod-
ucts in a series of 25 rounds: a 16-ounce jar
of salsa, an 8-ounce bag of tortilla chips, and
an 8-ounce bag of tortilla chips labeled “Made
in America from American ingredients.”5 We
chose these speciﬁc products because we be-
lieved participants were likely to be familiar
with them. To ensure that our results were not
simply an artifact of the auction mechanism
used, we varied the auction mechanism across
treatments. In the ﬁrst treatment, participants
bidongoodsusingthesecond-price,sealed-bid
auction (Vickrey, 1961). In the second treat-
ment, participants bid on goods using the ran-
dom nth-price auction (Shogren et al., 2001).6
The experiment included seven steps. In
Step 1, participants arrived, completed a con-
sent form, and were paid $5 for participating.7
In Step 2, participants were given written and
oral instructions on the auction mechanism to
be used in that treatment. They then took a
short quiz on the speciﬁc details of the auc-
tion mechanism. Because our primary interest
5 Although participants bid on these items in multiple rounds,
two features differentiate our auction from a repeated trial auc-
tionwithpostedprices.First,participantsbidonadifferentbundle
of goods in each round. Second, prices were not posted between
rounds, so participants’ bids were not inﬂuenced by the bids sub-
mitted by other participants in previous rounds. Therefore, we do
not run into the pitfalls of bid price afﬁliation that can occur in re-
peatedtrialauctions(ListandShogren,1999;CorriganandRousu,
forthcoming; Harrison, Harstad, and Rutstr¨ om, 2004).
6 Both of these auction mechanisms are demand revealing (i.e.,
bidding one’s true value is a weakly dominant strategy). In the
second-price auction, all bidders submit a sealed bid, and the top
bidder wins the auction and pays the second highest price. The
random nth-price auction differs only in that after the monitor
ranksthebidsfromhighesttolowest,herandomlyselectsanumber
between 2 and N (where N is the number of participants), and the
corresponding bid becomes the nth price. The n – 1 bidders who
submittedbidshigherthanthenthpricethenpurchasetheproduct
paying the randomly selected nth price.
7 Recent studies have shown that the size of the cash payment
thatparticipantsreceive(Loureiro,Umberger,andHine,2003)and
themannerinwhichitisprovidedtothem(Cherry,Frykblom,and
Shogren, 2002) can impact experimental results. To be consistent
with other experimental auction studies, our participants did not
have to perform any preliminary task to earn their participation
fee. Because any wealth/windfall effects from the participation fee
would affect the bids submitted in all rounds, this should have no
qualitative effect on our results. However, this would certainly be
an extension worth pursuing.450 May 2006 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
was not the performance of the auction mech-
anisms themselves, but understanding how
initial endowments affect value estimates, we
explicitly told participants that it would be in
their best interest to bid their true value. In
Step3,participantstookpartinaseriesofthree
practice auctions in order to ensure that they
understood both the auction mechanism and
the format of the upcoming rounds—that the




given the chance to examine the three food
products for sale in the auction. Depending on
the experimental unit, they began by bidding
in either Session A or Session B. Session B dif-
fered from Session A in that all participants
wouldbeendowedwithagoodifaroundfrom
Session B was chosen as binding. In both ses-
sionstheorderthatparticipantsbidonthefood
productswasrandomizedtoreduceanypoten-
tial order effects.9,10 In Step 5, participants bid
in Session A or Session B, whichever session
they did not bid in during Step 4. In Step 6, the
monitor announced the binding round. If the
binding round was from Session B, the good
wasdistributedatthispointintheexperiment.
Themonitorthendeterminedthemarketprice
and winning bidder(s) from the binding round
and executed any transactions. In Step 7, all
participants completed a questionnaire elicit-
ingbackgroundanddemographicinformation.
This concluded the experiment. The complete
setofinstructionsgiventoparticipantsisavail-
able from the authors upon request.
In most experimental auction studies, par-
ticipants are endowed with a basic good (e.g.,
an ordinary sandwich) and submit bids to up-
grade to a superior good (e.g., a sandwich that
has been screened for foodborne pathogens).
Consequently, winning the auction necessarily
involves losing the basic good. Our goal in this
study is to analyze the effects of initial endow-
ments in the absence of loss aversion, thus we
8 Rousu (2005) explains that randomly selecting one binding
round gives participants an incentive to bid their true value and
prevents bid reduction from demand curve effects, while Lusk,
Feldkamp, and Schroeder (2004) observe that bidding truthfully
is the dominant strategy so long as participants’ expected utilities
are linear in probabilities. Roosen et al. (1998) ﬁnd that results
from this type of auction are statistically similar to those from a
single-shot auction.
9 Forevidenceonhoworderingmattersinexperiments,seeHuff-
man et al. (2003).
10 The results from several of the rounds of bidding in this ex-
periment are not reported in this article. They are being used for
a separate project to estimate demand ﬂexibilities using auction
data.
deviate from this conventional design in that
we compare the value of a basic bundle (e.g.,
one jar of salsa) with a superior bundle (e.g.,
two jars of salsa). By eliminating the poten-
tial for loss, we eliminate any loss aversion. As
our results will show, this gives us unique in-
sight into the impact initial endowments have
on WTP bids in experimental auctions.
Results
In the absence of income or endowment ef-
fects, we would expect a participant’s WTP to
upgrade from one unit of a good to two units
of the same good to be equal to the difference
in that participant’s WTP for two units and his
WTP for one unit. That is,
WTP1→2 = WTP0→2 − WTP0→1. (1)
We take an initial look at the data by compar-
ing mean bids across rounds. We then report
theresultsofarandom-effectstobitmodelthat
takesintoaccountthepanelnatureofourdata.
Table 1 shows the mean bids for each of
thethreefoodproducts.Comparingtheﬁgures
from the fourth and ﬁfth columns reveals that
equation(1)failstohold.Themeanbidstoup-
grade are 61–75% greater than the difference
between the mean bids for one and two units.
These results are statistically signiﬁcant at the
0.01 level (using either a t-test or a Wilcoxon
signed-rank test). To our knowledge, no previ-
ousstudyhasshownthatendowingexperimen-
talauctionparticipantswithagoodleadsthem
to submit higher bids for subsequent units of
that same good.11 Indeed, the mean bids for
the second unit of each good when endowed
with the ﬁrst unit are 29–41% greater than the
mean bids for the ﬁrst unit in the absence of
endowment. These results are also statistically
signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level (again using either
a t-test or a Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
Table 2 reports the results of a random-
effects tobit regression where the dependent
variable is participant i’s WTP for the second
unit of each good both in the presence and
the absence of an initial endowment. Consis-
tent with the results from table 1, we ﬁnd that
initial endowments have a positive and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant impact on bids, suggesting
that initial endowments affect value estimates
11 The addiction and habit formation literature does show that
previous behavior or endowments can increase the value agents
placeongoods(e.g.,BeckerandMurphy,1988;Becker,Grossman,
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Table 1. Mean Bids (N = 94)
Mean Mean Bid
Difference to Upgrade
Mean Bid for Mean Bid for in Bids for One from One to
One Unit Two Units and Two Units Two Units
Plain-labeled chips $0.51 (0.51) $0.95 (1.00) $0.44 (0.55) $0.72∗∗ (0.83)
American-labeled chips $0.58 (0.56) $1.07 (1.06) $0.49 (0.58) $0.79∗∗ (0.94)
Salsa $0.65 (0.57) $1.13 (1.07) $0.48 (0.60) $0.84∗∗ (0.94)
Note: Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
Asterisks (∗∗) mean values reported in the fourth and ﬁfth columns are signiﬁcantly different at the 0.01 level.
even in an environment that does not present
the potential for loss aversion. We also ﬁnd
that the effect is larger in an nth-price auc-
tion. As mentioned earlier, Lusk, Feldkamp,
and Schroeder (2004) also ﬁnd that initial en-
dowmentsaffectbidsdifferentlydependingon
the auction mechanism used. Finally, we ﬁnd
that participants tend to submit higher bids
in treatments where they begin by bidding in




(2004) ﬁnd that bids elicited in an nth-price
auctionaresigniﬁcantlydifferentfromsecond-
Table 2. Random-Effects Tobit Regression




Bid submitted in an
endow-and-upgrade round
0.344∗∗ (0.036)
Bid submitted in an
endow-and-upgrade round
using the random nth-price
auction
0.186∗∗ (0.059)



















Note: The dependent variable is participant i’s bid for the second unit of a
good. Standard errors in parentheses.
Asterisks (∗, ∗∗) signiﬁcant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
priceauctionbids.However,theyﬁndthatnth-
price bids are signiﬁcantly lower, which is the
opposite of our result.
In order to mitigate the effects of bidder
fatigue, we followed Shogren et al. (1994)
and limited the total number of rounds in
our experiment to 25. There has been a vi-
brant debate in the experimental auction liter-
atureaboutthesaliencyofresultsfromstudies
whereparticipantsbidinmultiplerounds(e.g.,
Harrison, 1989, 1992; Cox, Smith, and Walker,
1992; Friedman, 1992; Kagel and Roth, 1992;
MerloandSchotter,1992).Withregardstothe
saliency of our results, we note that our pri-
maryresultisconsistentandhighlystatistically
signiﬁcant across goods, auction mechanisms,
and the ordering of rounds and sessions. We
also note that in order to help ensure accurate
bids, we explicitly told participants that bid-
dingtheirtruevaluewastheirbeststrategy.As
discussed in Merlo and Schotter, participants
who know their optimal strategy are less likely
to deviate from that strategy.
Reconciliation with Neoclassical
Consumer Theory
The most orthodox theoretical explanation of
our results would be to attribute the increase
inWTPinendowmentroundstoanincomeef-
fect. This, however, is not consistent with our
results. The mean monthly disposable income
from our sample was $230.85, while the mean
bidforonebagofplain-labeledchipswas$0.51
or 0.22% of monthly income. Given that en-
dowing participants with the ﬁrst bag of plain-
labeled chips led, on average, to a $0.28 in-
crease in WTP for the second bag (see table
1), this suggests that a 0.22% increase in in-
come led to a 64% increase in the mean bid
for a second bag of plain-labeled chips. This is
an implausibly large income effect given that
between-subject variations in income have no452 May 2006 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
statistically signiﬁcant impact on WTP (see
table 2).
In the remainder of this section we consider
two alternative explanations that may recon-
cile our results with neoclassical consumer
theory. First, it is possible that the endowment
effect observed in our study is attributable to
a “top-dog effect” where participants derive
added beneﬁt from being declared the winner
of an auction (Shogren and Hayes, 1997). Sup-
pose that no matter which round is chosen as
binding, an auction participant derives some
ﬁxed degree of added utility from winning for
winning’s sake, and that additional utility can
be expressed in dollar terms as w>0. Let a ≥
0 be the value the participant associates with
the ﬁrst unit of some good, and let b ≥ 0b e
the value he associates with the second unit.
We can then denote the participant’s WTP for
oneunitasWTP0→1 = a + w,hisWTPfortwo
unitsasWTP0→2 = a + b + w,andhisWTPto
upgrade to two units if he is endowed with the
ﬁrst as WTP1→2 = b + w.
In a demand-revealing auction where the
researcher endows participants with one unit
of a good and then asks them to submit bids
to upgrade to a second unit, the estimated
value of the second unit would be WTP1→2 =
b + w.Ontheotherhand,inanauctionexperi-
mentwheretheresearcherasksparticipantsto
submit bids for one unit and two units in dif-
ferentroundswiththeunderstandingthatonly
oneoftheroundswillbechosenasbinding,the
estimated value of the second unit would be
WTP0→2 –WTP0→1 =b.Ifthetop-dogeffectis
present,wewouldthenexpecttheendow-and-
upgrade approach to overestimate the value
of the second unit. Note that here we are as-
suming that w is a constant. If w is instead in-
creasing and concave in the private value of
the bundle being bid on, the separate-bids ap-
proach reduces the size of the top-dog effect
but does not completely eliminate it.
The previous evidence on the existence of
a top-dog effect has been mixed. Shogren and
Hayes (1997) report that nearly 90% of par-
ticipants in an induced-value auction market
submitted bids that were less than or equal to
theirassignedvalue.Theauthorsconcludethat
these results are not consistent with the exis-
tence of a top-dog effect. This contrasts with
Kagel’s (1995) review of the induced-value,
second-price auction literature, where he ﬁnds
that the mean bid in such auctions is generally
greater than what theory predicts. Such over-
biddingcanalsobeseeninmorerecentstudies
such as Cherry et al. (2004).
Our test is unique in that by focusing on
the disparity between WTP to upgrade from
one unit to two (i.e., WTP1→2) and the dif-
ference between WTP for two units and one
unit (i.e., WTP0→2 − WTP0→1), we are able
to use goods with homegrown values instead
of induced-values for hypothetical goods. This
test is more relevant to the agricultural/food
valuation literature because that literature fo-
cuses almost exclusively on goods with home-
grown values (e.g., Hayes et al., 1995; Alfnes
and Rickertsen, 2003).
An alternative explanation would be to
attribute the observed endowment effect to
feelings of “reciprocal obligation.” As Rabin
(1993, p. 1281) observes, “If somebody is be-
ing nice to you, fairness dictates that you be
nice to him.” Charness and Rabin (2002) de-
velop a theoretical model of reciprocity where
individualimeasureshiswelfareasaweighted
average of his own payoff and a social wel-
farefunction.Theweightplacedonotherindi-
viduals’ payoffs in this social welfare function
varies depending on individual i’s beliefs re-
garding how well he is being treated by each
of those individuals. The model can be used to
explain both “positive reciprocity” where an
individual sacriﬁces his own payoff in order to
increase the payoff of other individuals who
he feels have helped him, and “negative reci-
procity” where an individual sacriﬁces his own
payoff in order to decrease the payoff of other
individuals who he feels have wronged him.
While the authors ﬁnd no convincing evidence
of positive reciprocity in an experimental test,
McCabe, Rigdon, and Smith (2003) ﬁnd that
secondplayersinatwo-playersequentialgame
are signiﬁcantly more likely to choose a co-
operative [$25, $25] outcome over a defection
[$15,$30]outcomeiftheyaremadeawarethat
the ﬁrst player passed up a [$20, $20] outside
option. Applied to an experimental auction
setting, Charness and Rabin’s (2002) model
would predict that participants in an endow-
and-upgrade auction would tend to submit
higherbidsthanparticipantsinaseparate-bids
auction, because the endow-and-upgrade par-
ticipants may wish to repay the experimenter
for the initial endowment.
If we denote this desired reciprocity pay-
ment as r > 0, a participant endowed with one
unitandofferedthechancetoupgradetoasec-
ond unit would submit a bid WTP1→2 = b + r.
In contrast, a participant asked to submit sep-
arate bids for one unit and two units would
feelnosuchreciprocalobligation.Inthislatter
case, the researcher would estimate the valueCorrigan and Rousu Initial Endowments in Experimental Auctions 453




Bid for one unit 
 
01 WTP a w → =+  01 WTP →  = a 
Bid for two units 
 
02 WTP a b w → =++  02 WTP → = a + b 
Bid to upgrade from  
one unit to two units 
12 WTP b w → =+  12 WTP b r → =+ 
Figure 1. Top-dog and reciprocal-obligation willingness-to-pay speciﬁcations
ofthesecondunittobeWTP0→2 − WTP0→1 =
b. If a reciprocal-obligation effect is present,
we would then also expect the endow-and-
upgrade approach to overestimate the value
of the second unit.12
Figure 1 depicts the relationship between
WTP bids under the top-dog and reciprocal-
obligation speciﬁcations. The results from ta-
ble 3 cast light on the relative ﬁt of the top-dog
and reciprocal-obligation WTP speciﬁcations.
For the top-dog speciﬁcation we use the mean
bids reported in table 1 to estimate a, b, and w
as follows:
a = WTP0→2 − WTP1→2 (2)
b = WTP0→2 − WTP0→1 (3)
w = WTP1→2 − WTP0→2 + WTP0→1. (4)
For the reciprocal-obligation speciﬁcation, we
estimate b and r in the same way we esti-
mated b and w above, but we estimate a as
a = WTP0→1.13 Note that the results in table 3
show that under the top-dog speciﬁcation a is
less than b for all three goods. The opposite is
true under the reciprocal-obligation speciﬁca-
tion.Thus,ifweassumethatthedemandcurves
12 In order to test whether r is an increasing function of the value
biddersplaceontheﬁrstunitofagood,weuseﬁxed-effectsanalysis
to estimate r as a linear function of a, controlling for individual-
speciﬁc effects and the good being bid upon. We ﬁnd that the coef-
ﬁcient associated with a is positive and signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
This is intuitively appealing. The more generous the endowment,
the more obliged we would expect the bidder to feel.
13 If the participation fee increased a and b to by some constant
proportion   ≥ 1( e . g . ,W T P 0→2 =  a +  b under the reciprocal-
obligation speciﬁcation), this would have no impact on the mean
values for r and w reported in table 3.
Table 3. Mean Value Estimates under Top-
Dog and Reciprocal-Obligation Speciﬁcations
Top-Dog
ab w
Plain-labeled chips $0.23 $0.44 $0.28
American-labeled chips $0.28 $0.49 $0.30
Salsa $0.29 $0.48 $0.36
Reciprocal-Obligation
ab r
Plain-labeled chips $0.51 $0.44 $0.28
American-labeled chips $0.58 $0.49 $0.30
Salsa $0.65 $0.48 $0.36
for chips and salsa are downward sloping, the
reciprocal-obligationspeciﬁcationwouldseem
to better describe the aggregate data.
To get a better feel for the relative ﬁt of
the two speciﬁcations, we also look at in-
dividual WTP bids. Table 4 shows that for
each of the three goods, our estimates of w
Table 4. The Percentage of Participants
Whose Bids Are Consistent with Theory
Top-Dog
w>0 w ≥ 0 a ≥ b
Plain-labeled chips 49% 83% 60%
American-labeled chips 49% 81% 56%
Salsa 62% 83% 52%
Reciprocal-Obligation
r > 0 r ≥ 0 a ≥ b
Plain-labeled chips 49% 83% 90%
American-labeled chips 49% 81% 85%
Salsa 62% 83% 90%454 May 2006 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
Table 5. Random-Effects Probit Regression




Top-dog speciﬁcation 1.402∗∗ (0.107)




















Note: Dependent variable = 1i fa < b. Standard errors in parentheses.
Asterisks (∗, ∗∗) signiﬁcant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
and r are positive for roughly half of partic-
ipants, and are nonnegative for at least 81%
of participants. However, under the top-dog
speciﬁcation the corresponding estimates of
a are greater than or equal to the estimates
of b for at most 60% of participants. Under
the reciprocal-obligation speciﬁcation at least
85% of participants submitted bids such that
the resulting estimates of a are greater than or
equal to b.
Table 5 reports the results of a random-
effectsprobitanalysistestingwhetheraismore
likely to be less than b under the top-dog spec-
iﬁcation, where the dependent variable is a
dummy equaling 1 if a is less than b. These
resultsshowthattop-dogestimatesofaaresig-
niﬁcantly more likely to be less than b, which
is consistent with the ﬁgures reported in ta-
bles 3 and 4. Thus, while theory suggests that
either the top-dog effect or reciprocal obliga-
tion could contribute to the endowment effect
observed in experimental auctions, our results
aremoreconsistentwithreciprocalobligation.
Given that participants endowed with a
product become somewhat wealthier, it is also
possible that the observed disparity between
WTP1→2 and (WTP0→2 − WTP0→1) could be
attributed to a large windfall-gain effect. Em-
pirical work focusing on windfall gains in non-
auction laboratory experiments has produced
mixed results. Clark (2002), for example, ﬁnds
no evidence of windfall effects when compar-
ing voluntary contributions to a group fund
made by participants who did and did not re-
ceiveaninitialcashendowment.Forsytheetal.
(1994), on the other hand, ﬁnd that in a sim-
ple nonhypothetical dictator game more than
20% of participants offer up to at least half of
their windfall income. Hoffman, McCabe, and
Smith(1996)showthatthisresultissensitiveto
proceduralandinstructionalvariations.Inpar-
ticular, they ﬁnd that in a double-blind exper-
imental setting, fewer than 5% of participants
offer up to at least half of their windfall. And
most recently, Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren
(2002) ﬁnd that participants dividing windfall
income are signiﬁcantly more generous than
those dividing earned income. While none of
the participants in their study were willing to
part with more than half of their income, more
than 20% of those receiving a $10 windfall of-
fered up to $5. One constant across all of these
dictator games, though, is that the mean of-
fer is well below half of the windfall. For each
of the three goods in our study, we ﬁnd that
endowing participants with the ﬁrst unit of a
good leads to an increase in mean WTP for
the second unit equal to at least 52% of mean
WTP for the ﬁrst unit in the absence of en-
dowment. Deﬁning the average windfall in the
endow-and-upgrade rounds as the mean WTP
for the ﬁrst unit, it is highly unlikely in light
of the above-mentioned empirical studies that
endowment effects of this size are attributable
to windfall gains alone. However, reciprocal
obligation could be thought of as a variation
on windfall gains, where participants wish to
share their windfall with the experimenter.
Our results give new insight into the re-
sults of the only other published study that
has attempted to determine the effect of ini-
tial endowments on experimental auction re-
sults. Lusk, Feldkamp, and Schroeder (2004)
estimate the premium consumers place on
various grades of beefsteak, using both the
endow-and-upgrade and separate-bids meth-
ods. Interestingly, the authors ﬁnd a statis-
tically signiﬁcant endowment effect for the
random nth-price auction mechanism, no sig-
niﬁcant effect for the English and BDM
auctionmechanisms,andasigniﬁcant“reverse
endowment effect” for the second-price auc-
tion mechanism. We believe that this ambi-
guity may be an artifact of the experiment’s
design. Speciﬁcally, the authors compare the
value of a generic steak and a premium steak.
In the endow-and-upgrade treatments, win-
ning bidders would have to give up the steak
theywereendowedwithinordertoexchangeitCorrigan and Rousu Initial Endowments in Experimental Auctions 455
for a premium steak. In this context, loss aver-
sion would motivate these participants to bid
less,whilereciprocalobligationand/orthetop-
dog effect would motivate them to bid more.
The net effect is ambiguous. In our study, par-
ticipantsbidtoupgradefromoneunitofagood
to two units of that same good, thereby elim-
inating the possibility of loss and any poten-
tially confounding loss aversion.
Furtherresearchisnecessaryinordertobet-
ter understand the magnitude of the biases as-
sociatedwithinitialendowments,andhowand
why they are affected by the choice of auction
mechanism. Future research that can test for
the existence of the top-dog and reciprocal-
obligation effects in isolation would also be
interesting.
Conclusions and Implications
In this article we show that endowing auction
participants with a good signiﬁcantly affects
their valuation of that good even in the ab-
sence of loss aversion. We also postulate two
alternative explanations of our results that are
consistent with neoclassical consumer theory.
The ﬁrst is that participants derive some psy-
chicbeneﬁtfrombeingtopdog(i.e.,frombeing
declared the winner of an auction). The sec-
ond is that participants endowed with a good
wish to repay the experimenter by submitting
a higher bid. We ﬁnd that this second explana-
tion does a better job describing our auction
participants’ bidding behavior.
Theresultspresentedinthisarticlehaveim-
portant implications for the agricultural/food
safety valuation literature. In dozens of valua-
tion studies, researchers have endowed exper-
imental participants with a bundle and then
asked the participants how much they would
be willing to pay to exchange the bundle they
were endowed with for a different (and pre-
sumably superior) bundle. Our ﬁndings raise
questions about the accuracy and validity of
theresultsinthesearticles.Wehaveshownthat
participants’ WTP changes signiﬁcantly when
they are endowed with a good. As a result,
participants’ bids to upgrade cannot strictly
be interpreted as the premium they place on
the second bundle relative to the ﬁrst because
that value estimate is likely biased by the ini-
tialendowment.Further,becauselossaversion
would have the opposite effect of reciprocal
obligation, researchers will not know the di-
rection of the net bias. In many circumstances,
abettermethodforvaluingaparticulartraitor
characteristic would be to calculate the differ-
ence between participants’ bids from two dis-
tinct, potentially binding auction rounds, one
where participants bid on a good possessing
the trait of interest and one where they bid
on a good that does not (e.g., Rousu et al.,
2004).Notonlywouldthistechniqueeliminate
any endowment effect, it would also be more
consistent with the market environment par-
ticipants are likely to encounter outside of the
experimental auction.
We recognize, however, that there are cir-
cumstances where the endow-and-upgrade
method may be warranted. First, when us-
ing the endow-and-upgrade approach, the
researcher can impose a consumption require-
ment where, for example, participants are re-
quiredtoeateitherthefoodproducttheywere
endowed with or the one that they have paid
to upgrade to (e.g., Shogren et al., 1994). The
beneﬁt of this requirement is that it ensures
that the bid price represents bidders’ own con-
sumption value, not the value they associate
withgivingthegoodtosomeoneelseorselling
it outside of the experiment. And given that
bids are censored at zero, the consumption re-
quirement can also be used to elicit the pre-
mium bidders place on the novel trait, even if
the value they place on each good individually
is negative.
Second, the endow-and-upgrade approach
mayeliminateproblemsarisingfromtheavail-
ability of outside substitutes. Kolstad and
Guzman (1999) and Harrison, Harstad, and
Rutstr¨ om (2004) argue that if a good can be
purchasedoutsideoftheexperimentalauction,
WTP bids will be censored from above at or
nearthegood’soutsidemarketpricep.Cherry
et al. (2004) ﬁnd this to be the case in induced-
valueauctions,whileCorrigan(2005)ﬁndsthat
bids for a good with homegrown value are af-
fected by participants’ beliefs regarding the
relative difﬁculty of buying or selling the good
outside of the experimental auction. There-
fore, if auction participants are bidding sepa-
ratelyontwoproducts,anovelgoodthatisnot
available outside of the experimental market
and a conventional good that is, participants’
bids for the conventional good may be cen-
sored at or near p, resulting in an overestimate
of the premium placed on the novel good.
While endowing participants with the con-
ventional good and eliciting bids to upgrade
to the novel good would avoid these potential
biases, our results suggest that the initial en-
dowment would introduce a bias of its own.
Researchers must be mindful of the sign and456 May 2006 Amer. J. Agr. Econ.
the magnitude of potential biases, and should
designexperimentalauctionsaccordingly.This
is especially important in regards to the design
of hypothesis tests. Rejecting the null hypoth-
esisH0:$X =0infavorthealternativehypoth-
esis HA:$ X > 0 is meaningless if we know that
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